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Vulnerability of linear systems against sensor attacks–a system’s
security index
Michelle S. Chong1 and Margreta Kuijper2
Abstract— The ‘security index’ of a discrete-time LTI system
under sensor attacks is introduced as a quantitative measure
on the security of an observable system. We derive ideas from
error control coding theory to provide sufficient conditions for
attack detection and correction.
I. INTRODUCTION
The security of control systems against adversarial attacks
is a challenge to maintain when the adversary knows the
workings of any component of the system and has garnered
access, with the malicious intent of causing disruption. This
has lead to a proliferation of works in tackling this issue,
in particular in detecting the occurrence of an attack [9],
[8], [10], or in designing resilient control or estimation
algorithms, see [3], [11], [2], [1], [4] and many more.
In this paper, we concentrate on LTI systems where the
sensing component has been compromised by the attacker,
who has full knowledge of the system. The vulnerability of
the sensors is modelled by an additive attack signal to the
sensor measurements, which is non-zero when the particular
sensor is compromised. Inspired by ideas in coding theory,
we introduce the notion of the ‘security index’ for linear sys-
tems, a quantitative measure of the vulnerability of a system
to sensor attacks. While ideas from error control coding have
already been employed to this context in recent literature [3],
our aim is to further strengthen this link. Our notion of a
‘security index’ is formulated based on the measurement time
series from all sensors and is analogous to the notion of the
‘minimum distance’ of a code in error control coding theory.
We demonstrate that by using ideas from coding theory, the
formulation simplifies the approach in [3], leading to new
results. Particularly, we express the ‘security index’ of a
system in terms of different representations of the system
concerned.
Previous works in state estimation for systems under
sensor attacks include [2], [3], [1], [9], [10], [7]. There is
a consensus with [3] and [2] that the states of an LTI system
can only be reconstructed if strictly less than half of the
sensors are under attack. We will see in this paper that this
condition is also derived when approached with ideas from
coding theory. Other related works are [5], [4] which focus
on power networks. It is in this specialised setting that the
authors of [4] introduce the terminology ‘security index’,
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which we adopted for a broader context in this paper. The
presence of measurement noise has been considered in [7],
which we do not consider, but is the subject of further work.
Notation: We denote the set of integers and complex numbers
as Z and C, respectively. The notation Z+ is used to denote
the set of positive integers including 0.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a discrete-time, observable linear time-
invariant (LTI) system Σ given by a n × n state matrix A
and a N × n observation matrix C, defined as follows:
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) (1)
y(t) = Cx(t). (2)
The behavior B of the system is defined as the set of all
possible output trajectories y : Z+ 7→ CN that satisfy the
system’s equations for some initial condition x(0) ∈ Cn.
Due to the time-invariant finite dimensional nature of the
underlying system, the behavior B has the following two
properties:
• B is left-shift invariant: if y ∈ B then σy ∈ B, where
the shift operator σ is defined via σy(t) := y(t+ 1).
• B is autonomous: there exists T ∈ Z+ such that for any
y ∈ B and y˜ ∈ B we have that y|[0,T ] = y˜|[0,T ] implies
that y = y˜.
We assess the vulnerability of an LTI system via its mea-
surable outputs, which may have been compromised by an
attacker. While the usual assumption for many applications
is that the matrix C has full row rank, we do not make
such an assumption in our setting. This setting occurs in
the case where each sensor is measuring a local part of the
system, such as in sensor networks implemented in a large
geographical location. To aid in the introduction of a measure
of a system’s security against sensor attacks, we define the
following for a system’s trajectory.
Definition 2.1: The support of a trajectory y : Z+ 7→ CN ,
denoted by supp (y), is defined as the set of indices i
in {0, 1, 2, . . . , N} such that its component trajectory yi :
Z+ 7→ C is not the zero trajectory.
Definition 2.2: The weight of a trajectory y, denoted by
‖y‖, is defined as |supp (y)|, i.e., the number of components
of y that are not the zero trajectory.
We now introduce a concept that is central to this paper:
Definition 2.3: The security index of the system Σ is
defined as
δ(Σ) := min
06=y∈B
‖y‖.
This notion plays a paramount role in our investigation into
the resilience of the system under adversarial attack. More
precisely, we consider attacks on the system Σ that result in
the system Σ′ given by:
Σ′ : x(t+ 1) = Ax(t)
r(t) = Cx(t) + η(t),
where η : Z+ 7→ CN is the unknown attack signal and
r : Z+ 7→ C
N is the known received signal. Thus we are
focusing exclusively on scenarios where the system’s outputs
(= sensors) are attacked. The behavior B′ of the system Σ′
is defined as the set of all possible trajectories r that satisfy
the above equations for some initial condition x(0) and some
attack signal η. We consider the following two problems:
Problem 1 (attack detection): Given received signal
r ∈ B′, detect that r /∈ B.
Problem 2 (attack correction): Given received sig-
nal r ∈ B′, find y ∈ B such that ‖r−y‖ is minimal.
In the sections that follow, we derive conditions such that
the problems above are solvable in a tractable manner.
III. CONDITIONS FOR ATTACK DETECTION AND
CORRECTION USING A SYSTEM’S SECURITY INDEX
The first question that arises is: under which conditions
on the attack signal η are these problems solvable? We have
the following results.
Theorem 3.1: Suppose the received signal r ∈ B′ corre-
sponds to an attack η with ‖η‖ an unknown non-zero value
< δ(Σ). Then r /∈ B, i.e., attack detection is possible.
Proof: Let r and η be as stated in the theorem and let
y ∈ B be such that r = y + η. Then r − y /∈ B because
of Definition 2.3 and the assumption that 0 6= ‖η‖ < δ(Σ).
Since B is linear it then follows that r /∈ B.
Consequently, we can interpret the security index δ(Σ) as
the minimum number of sensors that an attacker needs to
compromise without being detected. We call the system Σ
maximally secure if δ(Σ) = N . It is easily seen that generi-
cally, systems described by equations (1)-(2) are maximally
secure.
Theorem 3.2: Suppose the received signal r ∈ B′ corre-
sponds to an attack η with ‖η‖ an unknown value < δ(Σ)/2.
Then there exists a unique y ∈ B such that ‖r − y‖ is
minimal, i.e. unique attack correction is possible.
Proof: Let r be as stated in the theorem and let y1 ∈ B
and η1 be such that r = y1 + η1 with ‖η1‖ < δ(Σ)/2.
Suppose that there also exist y2 ∈ B and η2 such that r =
y2 + η2 with ‖η2‖ < δ(Σ)/2. Clearly ‖η1 − η2‖ < δ(Σ),
so that y1 − y2 = η1 − η2 is a trajectory in B of weight
< δ(Σ). Definition 2.3 now implies that y1 − y2 is the zero
trajectory, in other words, y1 = y2 is unique. It follows that
‖r− y1‖ = ‖η1‖ < δ(Σ)/2 is minimal.
We have formulated system Σ’s security index δ(Σ) and
results in therms of the output trajectory y, instead of Σ’s
initial condition x(0) to transparently draw an analogy with
error control coding. In fact, this choice is natural because the
recovery of x(0) is equivalent to having y ∈ B during attack
correction, due to the observability assumption on system Σ.
IV. COMPUTING A SYSTEM’S SECURITY INDEX
In this section, we show how system Σ’s security index
δ(Σ) can be computed. To this end, we introduce the coding
matrix G of the system Σ defined as follows
G =


G1
G2
.
.
.
GN

 , where Gi :=


Ci
CiA
CiA
2
.
.
.
CiA
n−1


(3)
with Ci defined as the i’th row of C for i = 1, . . . , N .
We call the above matrix G the coding matrix of the
system as it exhibits the link with error control coding [6].
Note however in contrast to error control coding, the coding
matrix G cannot be chosen freely—instead, it is fixed and
given by the system Σ. In particular, the number of sensors N
is fixed. In the following theorem, we use GJ to denote the
matrix that is obtained by stacking the matrices Gi defined
in (3), for i ∈ J ⊆ {1, . . . , N}.
Theorem 4.1:
δ(Σ) = N − L,
where L is the largest integer in {0, 1, . . . , N} for which
there exists a subset J of {1, . . . , N} of cardinality L such
that kerGJ 6= {0}.
Proof: Let J be a subset of {0, 1, . . . , N} of cardinality
L such that kerGJ 6= {0}. Let x(0) 6= 0 be such that
GJ x(0) = 0. Then Gx(0) 6= 0 because of left invertibility
of G. Furthermore, the trajectory y that corresponds to initial
condition x(0) satisfies yJ = 0 (use Cayley-Hamilton).
Thus y is a trajectory in B of weight ≤ N − L, so that
δ(Σ) ≤ N − L. Further, by definition of L, trajectories in
B cannot have more than L of their component trajectories
equal to the zero trajectory. Therefore δ(Σ) = N − L.
Corollary 4.2: The system Σ given by equations (1)-(2)
is maximally secure if and only if each matrix Gi, as defined
in (3), has full column rank (i = 1, 2, . . . , N ).
Not surprisingly, a system is maximally secure if and only
if the system is observable via each sensor. In this case, we
obtain from Theorem 3.2 that the sufficient condition for the
attack on the system to be correctable is that the number
of compromised sensors is strictly less than half of the total
number of sensors. This conforms with the results in [3]
and [2] for discrete-time and continuous-time LTI systems,
respectively.
We further provide ways of computing a system’s security
index δ(Σ). Since we assume that the LTI system is observ-
able and hence the nN × n matrix G given by (3) has full
rank, there exists a full rank (n(N − 1) × nN) matrix H ,
written as
H =
[
H1 H2 · · · HN
]
, (4)
such that HG = 0; mindful of the analogous coding theoretic
terminology, in this paper we call such a matrix H a check
matrix of the system. In the next theorem HJ denotes
the matrix that is obtained by juxtaposing the matrices Hi
defined in (4), for i ∈ J ⊂ {1, . . . , N}.
Theorem 4.3:
δ(Σ) = spark (H),
where spark (H) is defined as the smallest integer L in
{1, . . . , N} for which there exists a subset J of {1, . . . , N}
of cardinality L such that kerHJ 6= {0}.
Proof: Let J be a subset of {1, . . . , N} of cardinality
L such that kerHJ 6= {0}. Let yJ be a non-zero trajectory
such that HJyJ = 0. Let y be the trajectory that coincides
with yJ at the appropriate locations and that has zero
component trajectories at all other locations. Then y is a
trajectory in B of weight ≤ spark (H), so that δ(Σ) ≤
spark (H). Further, by definition of spark (H), trajectories
in B have weight ≥ spark (H) (use Cayley-Hamilton) and
therefore δ(Σ) = spark (H).
The terminology ”spark” stems from the compressed sens-
ing literature [12].
Corollary 4.4: The system Σ given by equations (1)-(2)
is maximally secure if and only if all square n(N − 1) ×
n(N − 1) submatrices of H of the form HJ , where J is a
subset of {1, . . . , N} of cardinality N − 1, are nonsingular.
An alternative representation of the system Σ is given by
a set of N difference equations
R(σ)y = 0, (5)
where R(ξ) is a N ×N polynomial matrix and σ represents
the left shift, as before. In the special case where R(ξ)
corresponds to a minimal lag representation, its N row
degrees are the observability indices of the system Σ.
Recall that a square polynomial matrix is called unimod-
ular if it has a polynomial inverse; a nonsquare polynomial
matrix is called left unimodular if it has a polynomial left
inverse. Two polynomial matrices R(ξ) and Q(ξ) of the same
size are called left unimodularly equivalent if there exists a
unimodular matrix U(ξ) such that Q(ξ) = U(ξ)R(ξ).
Theorem 4.5: Let the system Σ be given by (5). Then its
security index δ(Σ) is given by the smallest integer L in
{1, . . . , N} for which there exists a subset J of {1, . . . , N}
of cardinality L such that RJ (ξ) is not left unimodular (here
RJ (ξ) denotes the matrix that consists of the ith columns
of R(ξ) where i ∈ J ).
Proof: Let J be a subset of {1, . . . , N} of cardinality
L such that RJ (ξ) is not left unimodular. Then there exists
yJ 6= 0 such that RJyJ = 0. Let y be the trajectory that
coincides with yJ at the appropriate locations and that has
zero component trajectories at all other locations. Then y
is a trajectory in B of weight ≤ L, so that δ(Σ) ≤ L. By
definition of L we must also have δ(Σ) ≥ L which proves
the theorem.
In the remainder of this section, we show that the system
Σ’s security index δ(Σ) can be computed more easily by
exploiting the system’s special structure. Below, supp (y)
denotes the support of a vector y ∈ CN , i.e. the set of
indices i in {0, 1, 2, . . . , N} such that yi 6= 0. As mentioned
in Definition 2.1, supp (y) denotes the support of a trajectory
y, i.e. the set of indices i in {0, 1, 2, . . . , N} such that yi is
not the zero trajectory.
Lemma 4.6: Let the system Σ be given by equations (1)-
(2). Let x(0) be a linear combination of eigenvectors of A
that correspond to different eigenvalues, so
x(0) = α1v1 + α2v2 + · · ·+ αmvm, (6)
where 0 6= αj ∈ C, Avj = λjvj for j = 1, 2, . . . ,m and
λj 6= λi for j 6= i. Let y be the trajectory in the behavior B
of Σ that corresponds to x(0). Then
supp (y) = ∪mj=1supp (Cvj). (7)
Proof: It follows immediately from the definition of y
that
supp (y) ⊂ ∪mj=1supp (Cvj). (8)
To prove the reverse inclusion, let ℓ ∈ ∪mj=1supp (Cvj).
Then there exists i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} such that Cℓvi 6= 0.
Since αi is assumed non-zero it follows that αiCℓvi 6= 0.
Then

yℓ(0)
yℓ(1)
yℓ(2)
.
.
.

 =


1 1 · · · 1
λ1 λ2 · · · λm
λ21 λ
2
2 · · · λ
2
m
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.




α1Cℓv1
α2Cℓv2
.
.
.
αmCℓvm


is non-zero because of the Vandermonde structure and the
fact that all λi’s are distinct. Thus yℓ is not the zero trajectory
so that ℓ ∈ supp (y). This implies that
∪mj=1 supp (Cvj) ⊂ supp (y). (9)
From (8) and (9) we conclude that (7) holds.
A special consequence of the above lemma is that the
system’s security index δ(Σ) is determined by the weight
of the special trajectories that have initial conditions in an
eigenspace Vi of A:
Theorem 4.7: Let the system Σ be given by equations (1)-
(2). Let λ1, λ2, . . . , λm be the m distinct eigenvalues of the
matrix A. Let Cn = V1 ∪ V2 ∪ . . . ∪ Vm, where Vi is the
subspace spanned by all eigenvectors corresponding to λi
for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Then
δ(Σ) = min
j∈{1,2,...,m}
min
x∈Vj
|supp (Cx)|,
In particular, if m = n, meaning that all n eigenvalues of A
are distinct, then
δ(Σ) = min
j∈{1,2,...,n}
|supp (Cvj)|,
where v1, v2, . . . , vn is a basis of eigenvectors of A.
Proof: Let y be an arbitrary trajectory in B, correspond-
ing to initial condition x(0), written as in (6). It follows from
Lemma 4.6 that
‖y‖ = |supp (y)| ≥ min
j∈{1,2,...,m}
|supp (Cvj)|.
This implies that
δ(Σ) ≥ min
j∈{1,2,...,m}
min
x∈Vj
|supp (Cx)|.
To prove the reverse inequality, let j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} and
x ∈ Vj be such that |supp (Cx)| is minimal. Let y ∈ B be
the system’s trajectory that corresponds to initial condition
x(0) := x. From Ax = λjx it follows immediately that
‖y‖ = |supp (Cx)|. Therefore
δ(Σ) ≤ min
j∈{1,2,...,m}
min
x∈Vj
|supp (Cx)|.
which proves the theorem.
From the theorem above, we see that the computation of
the security index is straightforward for a system that has
n distinct eigenvalues : simply use a diagonal A-matrix; the
security index of the system is then given by the size of
the support of the sparsest column of the corresponding C-
matrix. In particular, the system is maximally secure if and
only if this C-matrix has no zero values. We now illustrate
the computation of system Σ’s security index through an
example.
Example 4.8: Let N = 2 and consider
A =
[
λ1 0
0 λ2
]
, C =
[
1 1
1 −1
]
.
Then it follows from Theorem 4.7 that for λ1 6= λ2 the
system’s security index is 2 so that by Theorem 3.1 detection
of attacks on one output is possible. Minimal lag equations
for this system are given by
R(σ)y =
[
σ − λ1 σ − λ1
σ − λ2 −(σ − λ2)
] [
y1
y2
]
= 0.
We observe that when λ1 6= λ2, every column of R(σ) is
left unimodular. Hence, by Theorem 4.5, we obtain L = N
and thus, the security index δ(Σ) equals N .
V. ATTACK DETECTION, CORRECTION AND OTHER
FUTURE WORK
Using the results developed in the previous sections, we
now discuss how they can be employed in detecting the
occurrence of an attack and how correction can be performed.
To start with detection, we first recall that the observability
assumption on our system implies that a check matrix
H (defined in (4)) exists. Attack detection is most easily
formulated in terms of H as follows.
Attack detection rule: Given received signal r ∈
B′, compute the ‘syndrome trajectory’ s := Hr
and conclude that an attack has taken place (mean-
ing r /∈ B) if and only if s 6= 0.
Alternatively, we can use the description of the form
R(σ)y = 0 as the main ingredient of our decision rule to
detect/correct.
Attack detection rule: Given received signal r ∈
B′, compute the ‘syndrome trajectory’ s := R(σ)r
and conclude that an attack has taken place (mean-
ing r /∈ B) if and only if s 6= 0.
In this paper, we choose to formulate all fundamental notions
and results in terms of the trajectory y rather than in terms of
the initial condition x(0) so as to have a clear fundamental
theory that exhibits the link with error control coding in a
transparent way. Indeed, we are able to make this choice be-
cause for attack correction the recovery of x(0) is equivalent
to the recovery of y ∈ B due to the observability assumption
on the system Σ. It is however important to note that in
practical situations the recovery of x(0) from the received
trajectory r is the main objective. In fact, we only need to
consider attack scenarios where attacks happen in the first n
time instances (otherwise we can simply reconstruct x(0)
from (r(0), r(1), · · · , r(n − 1)) = (y(0), y(1), · · · , y(n))
because of the observability of Σ).
For attack correction, the above syndrome trajectory s
should be used to identify the attack locations. Once the
attack locations have been found, x(0) can be computed
on the basis of the remaining attack-free components of y.
How to identify the attack locations from s in terms of our
knowledge of the system matrices A and C is a topic of
future research. Another topic of future research is the effect
of feedback control on the security index of an LTI system
with inputs.
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